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I. INTRODUCTION 
Impaired driving accidents are responsible for thousands of 
deaths each year—on average one every fifty-three minutes.1 In 
     †  J.D. Candidate, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, 2018; B.S. Sociology, 
University of Minnesota, 2013. 
1. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2178 (2016) (citing NHTSA, 
TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED DRIVING (2015), 
1
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addition to the toll on human life, impaired driving arrests place an 
enormous burden on our criminal justice system: law enforcement 
carried out more than 1.1 million arrests for driving-while-impaired 
(DWI) in 2014.2 To help enforce DWI laws, every state in the country 
has “implied consent” laws that require drivers to undergo testing 
when there is sufficient reason to believe that they are impaired.3 
These laws have been the subject of significant litigation in recent 
years, up to and including the United States Supreme Court.4 
The United States Supreme Court recently released its decision 
in Birchfield v. North Dakota.5 The Birchfield Court held that 
criminalizing the refusal to take a warrantless breath test incident to 
arrest for DWI is constitutional but criminalizing the refusal to take 
a blood test under the same circumstances is not.6 The Court left a 
significant question unanswered by not ruling on the 
constitutionality of criminalizing the refusal to take a warrantless 
urine test incident to arrest for DWI, the other common method of 
testing allowed by the DWI statutes.7 Only months after the Birchfield 
decision was released, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled on this 
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/Publication/812231). Between 2005 
and 2014 deaths from alcohol-impaired driving crashes ranged from 13,582 (2005) 
to 9865 (2011). Id. 
2. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2014: ARRESTS 2 (2015), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014 
/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/persons-arrested/persons-arrested.pdf. 
3. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., REPORT NO. DOT HS 811374,
ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY: A REVIEW OF THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE xxxiii (2011), 
https://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/pdf/811374.pdf. 
4. See, e.g., Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2160 (analyzing the constitutionality of
breath and blood searches incident to arrest); Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 
(2013) (analyzing the constitutionality of warrantless blood searches under the 
exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment); Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (analyzing the constitutionality of a warrantless 
blood search that was used to convict Schmerber of DWI); State v. Bernard, 859 
N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 2015) (holding that warrantless breath searches are 
constitutionally permissible incident to arrest); State v. Netland, 762 N.W.2d 202 
(Minn. 2009) (holding that warrantless searches are justified by the “single factor” 
exigency of the natural dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream), abrogated in 
part by McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552. 
5. 136 S. Ct. at 2184.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 2168 n.1 (declining to pass judgment on the constitutionality of urine
testing because “urine tests appear to be less common in drunk-driving cases than 
breath and blood tests, and none of the cases before us involves one”). 
2
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issue in State v. Thompson.8 The Thompson court held that a 
warrantless test of an arrestee’s urine incident to arrest for DWI 
constitutes an unconstitutional search and refusing to take such a 
test cannot be criminalized.9 
To help explain the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in 
Thompson, this Note begins with a brief historical overview of the 
exclusionary rule as applied to the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.10 Next, this Note examines some of the 
significant cases that provided the framework for the Thompson 
court’s analysis.11 This Note then focuses on Thompson and lays out 
the facts and procedural history of the case. Finally, this Note 
analyzes the Thompson court’s decision and argues that the court 
erred due to incorrectly weighing the interests involved and failing 
to give adequate consideration to the purpose of the warrant 
requirement. Therefore, this Note encourages the Minnesota 
Supreme Court to reconsider its decision in a future case or, 
alternatively, encourages the United States Supreme Court to grant 
certiorari to address this issue.12 
II. BACKGROUND: IMPORTANT CONCEPTS IN DWI
JURISPRUDENCE 
“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded . . . 
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his 
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless 
by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”13 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees the right of people to be free from “unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”14 This generally requires law enforcement 
officers to obtain a warrant from a judge or magistrate before 
searching or seizing an individual, but there are many exceptions to 
this rule.15 This Note first explains what the exclusionary rule is and 
8. 886 N.W.2d 224 (2016).
9. Id.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. See State v. Hummel, 483 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 1992) (citing Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)) (“[W]arrantless searches and seizures are per se 
unreasonable unless they fall under an established exception.”). 
3
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provides a brief history of its development before moving on to 
describe a number of judicially created exceptions to the rule. 
While it is impossible to define exactly what constitutes a search 
in every scenario,16 the Supreme Court laid out an important test for 
what is protected under the Fourth Amendment in Katz v. United 
States.17 For the purposes of this Note, the relevant point is that 
government collection of samples of a suspect’s blood, breath, or 
urine for the purpose of testing for the presence of alcohol or drugs 
constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.18  
A. Brief Overview of the Exclusionary Rule 
Because the judiciary is charged with interpreting and applying 
the law, courts safeguard the right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures through a mechanism called the “exclusionary 
rule.”19 Under this rule, if police obtain a piece of evidence through 
an unconstitutional search, then the evidence may be inadmissible 
at trial.20 This rule was created by the Supreme Court to deter the 
executive branch—including police and other law enforcement 
agencies—from future Fourth Amendment violations.21 This is a vital 
enforcement mechanism because law enforcement officers’ jobs 
would be unquestionably simpler if they did not have to comply with 
16. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (holding that not
only does a person have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home but also in 
the “curtilage,” or area immediately around his home); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 
573, 586 (1980) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 473 (1971)) 
(“It is a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside 
a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 
U.S. 128 (1978) (holding that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy for the 
contents of the glove box of a vehicle that a person does not possess or own). 
17. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The starting point for constitutional protection from
unreasonable searches is a “reasonable” or “legitimate” expectation of privacy on 
the part of the person being searched. Id. at 354–56. 
18. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989)
(rejecting the government’s claim that searches of blood, breath, and urine did not 
implicate the Fourth Amendment). 
19. See State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012) (“Evidence resulting
from an unreasonable seizure must be excluded.”). 
20. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016); see also State v. Ture, 632
N.W.2d 621, 627 (Minn. 2001) (“The state bears the burden of establishing an 
exception to the warrant requirement.”). 
21. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (noting that the
exclusionary rule was created by the Court in order to “compel respect for the 
constitutional guaranty”); see also Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236 (2011). 
4
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the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable 
searches.22 Further, because law enforcement officers are not 
directly under the control of the judicial branch, the judiciary has 
no power to sanction them directly for Fourth Amendment 
violations.23 Thus, if courts are to protect Fourth Amendment rights, 
they can only do so indirectly after a violation has occurred. 
Interestingly, prior to the creation of the exclusionary rule, the 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures was defended through tort suits or self-help.24 In the late 
eighteenth century, it was not illegal for a person to forcibly resist a 
police officer’s unjustifiable search.25 An officer’s intrusion on a 
person’s Fourth Amendment rights constituted trespass, and the 
officer could theoretically be held personally liable in tort or could 
even face criminal charges.26 Though it seems doubtful that such 
actions were common, they did arise from time to time.27 
22. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (“The investigation of crime
would always be simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the Fourth 
Amendment reflects the view . . . that the privacy of a person’s home and property 
may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of 
the criminal law.”). 
23. See Ruth W. Grant, The Exclusionary Rule and the Meaning of Separation of
Powers, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 173, 175 (1991) (“The separation of executive 
from judicial power . . . is a means to enforce constitutional limits on government 
action. . . . Executive abuses can be checked by an independent judiciary, because 
the action of both branches is required to bring about an individual’s punishment. 
If the courts treat the fruits of an unconstitutional search as valid, they allow the 
government as a whole to proceed against the individual in violation of the 
constitutional limits established by the Fourth Amendment.”); see also Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (stating that when 
police officers violate the Fourth Amendment but find nothing incriminating, “this 
invasion of the personal liberty of the innocent too often finds no practical 
redress”). While in many cases application of the exclusionary rule will allow guilty 
persons to go free, it is arguably the only practical method of enforcing Fourth 
Amendment rights because “freedom from unreasonable search differs from some 
of the other rights of the Constitution in that there is no way the innocent citizen 
can invoke advance protection.” Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 182 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
24. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV.
547, 625 (1999). 
25. Id. at 624–25.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 643 (1878) (analyzing a trespass claim
against an individual tax collector for “causing the seizure of a quantity of whiskey 
belonging to” the plaintiff). 
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B. Relevant Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence can be very complicated, 
especially when facing exceptions to the warrant requirement28 and 
exceptions to those exceptions.29 The text of the Fourth 
Amendment is useful to anchor the analysis of the judicial doctrine. 
The Fourth Amendment reads as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.30 
While the warrant requirement for searches and seizures is 
implicit in the language of the Fourth Amendment, long standing 
judicial interpretation helps to clarify the analytical structure of the 
Fourth Amendment. The “ultimate touchstone” of Fourth 
Amendment analysis is reasonableness.31 The reasonableness of a 
search requires balancing the individual’s right to personal security 
and autonomy against the state’s interest of protecting public 
safety.32 Warrantless searches “are per se unreasonable under the 
28. See, e.g., Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2187 (2016) (holding
that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement does not 
permit warrantless blood tests); Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1570 (2013) 
(reviewing “several sets of exigent circumstances excusing the need for a warrant”); 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (establishing a limited exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement to allow police officers to pat down a suspect 
for weapons when they believe the individual is armed and dangerous); see also Davis 
v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 248 (2011) (holding that there can be a good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule in some cases). In cases in which a search is 
rendered unconstitutional after the fact through a ruling in a different case, the 
court may still allow the unconstitutionally obtained evidence to be used at trial if 
the offending officer was relying on binding appellate precedent at the time of the 
search. Davis, 564 U.S. at 239–40. 
29. See, e.g., People v. Levan, 62 N.Y.2d 139, 146 (1984) (holding that since “the
police themselves cannot by their own conduct create an appearance of exigency,” 
the state cannot have evidence gathered in a subsequent warrantless search 
admitted at trial under the exigent circumstances exception). 
30. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
31. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 398 (2006).
32. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (stating that
analysis of the reasonableness of a seizure requires “a balance between the public 
interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary 
interference by law officers”). 
6
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Fourth Amendment.”33 Still, the right to be free from warrantless 
searches and seizures has a number of judicially created exceptions 
and limitations.34 Three of the most important are searches incident 
to arrest, exigent circumstances, and administrative (also known as 
inventory) exceptions. 
This Note primarily focuses on the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception. Under this exception, once an officer has probable 
cause35 to believe a suspect has committed a crime and has placed 
the suspect under arrest, the officer may conduct a search of the 
suspect and the “area within his immediate control.”36 This 
exception exists for the dual purpose of officer safety and evidence 
preservation.37 Searches incident to arrest are categorically 
permitted and do not require a case-by-case analysis of the 
reasonableness of the search.38 Because these searches are not 
subject to a reasonableness analysis based on the totality of the 
circumstances, litigation surrounding searches incident to arrest 
typically revolve around the permissible scope of the search.39 
Exigent circumstances is another important exception to the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.40 Under this 
exception, “‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law 
33. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978).
34. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
35. Probable cause cannot be defined with specificity, but it “exists where ‘the
facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had 
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man 
of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed.” 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). 
36. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009) (quoting Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). 
37. See id. at 339.
38. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) (citing Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925)) (stating that there is a long held “categorical 
recognition of the validity of a search incident to lawful arrest”). 
39. See, e.g., Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184 (2016) (holding
that a warrantless breath test is constitutional as a search incident to arrest, but a 
warrantless blood test is not); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) 
(holding that when a cell phone is discovered as part of a warrantless search incident 
to arrest, the data on that cell phone may not be searched without a warrant); Gant, 
556 U.S. at 343 (holding that police officers may search a car as a search incident to 
arrest when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment, regardless of whether the officers have reason to believe that 
evidence of the crime that was the reason for arrest may be found within the car). 
40. See, e.g., Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013).
7
Weichsel: More Like Blood: State v. Thompson
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
932 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:4 
enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”41 However, if an officer 
believes (even in good faith) that the exigencies of a situation 
require him or her to take action without the specific approval of a 
magistrate and a court later determines that the officer was not 
justified in this belief, the court would have to exclude any evidence 
seized during the search.42 Unlike the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception, the exigency exception cannot be applied categorically 
and requires an analysis of the totality of the circumstances to 
determine whether the search was objectively reasonable.43 
The administrative, or inventory, exception is another 
categorical exception to the warrant requirement that is similar to, 
but distinct from, the search-incident-to-arrest exception.44 Under 
this exception, when a suspect is taken back to a jail for processing, 
officers may perform a full search of the suspect.45 
The rationale behind inventory searches is not always clear. In 
one case, the Supreme Court ruled that “an inventory search must 
not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover 
incriminating evidence.”46 In other words, such a search exists for 
administrative purposes and not for the purpose of discovering 
evidence that may be used against a suspect at a later date.47 
In a recent case, the Supreme Court appeared to take a slightly 
more expansive approach to these administrative purposes, stating 
41. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (quoting McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)). 
42. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 405 (2006).
43. See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1563 (holding that the natural dissipation of
alcohol from the bloodstream cannot constitute a per se exigency and that the 
exigent circumstances exception always requires an analysis of the totality of the 
circumstances). 
44. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1974 (2013) (upholding a
warrantless collection of DNA to identify suspects after arrest); Florida v. Wells, 495 
U.S. 1, 4–5 (1990) (holding that an inventory search of an arrestee’s impounded 
vehicle is generally appropriate, but evidence produced by an officer acting on an 
individualized suspicion rather than standard practice violated the Fourth 
Amendment). 
45. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1974 (“[T]he Court has been reluctant to
circumscribe the authority of the police to conduct reasonable booking searches.”). 
46. Wells, 495 U.S. at 4.
47. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (“[I]nventory procedures
serve to protect an owner’s property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure 
against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from 
danger.”). 
8
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that the DNA tests which served to identify arrestees were 
permissible.48 Part of the Court’s reasoning was that the government 
has a strong public safety interest in determining if the suspects 
whom it has under arrest are connected to any other crimes.49 
III. HISTORY: KEY CASES THAT INFLUENCE DWI LITIGATION
Because the stakes are frequently so high in criminal cases, 
lower courts are often fortunate to have an abundance of guidance 
to analyze difficult issues. In defining the scope of the permissible 
bounds of government searches of persons, there are too many truly 
important cases for this Note to do justice.50 Instead of trying to cover 
every important case, this Part first examines the most significant 
cases in which the Court focused on defining the scope of 
permissible searches incident to arrest. This Part then examines two 
cases dealing with warrantless government testing of persons in a 
non-DWI context, before finally examining the two recent DWI cases 
that were litigated at the Supreme Court. 
A. Defining the Scope of Searches Incident to Arrest 
An early decision that is still very influential in Fourth 
Amendment DWI jurisprudence is Schmerber v. California.51 After 
Schmerber and a friend drank at a bowling alley, Schmerber got 
behind the wheel of his car and crashed into a tree.52 Because of 
their injuries, Schmerber and his friend were both taken to a 
48. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1973. Regardless, because such searches are
constitutional when they are carried out under proper procedures and without the 
motive of investigating possible criminal activity, any evidence found during such a 
search is admissible at a later trial. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 370 
n.5 (1976) (“The probable-cause approach is unhelpful when analysis centers upon
the reasonableness of routine administrative caretaking functions, particularly when 
no claim is made that the protective procedures are a subterfuge for criminal 
investigations.”). 
49. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1973 (noting the strong government interest in
accurately identifying arrestees, because “past conduct is essential to an assessment 
of the danger [an arrestee] poses to the public”). 
50. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT (5th ed. 2012) (noting that between 1978 and 2012 the United States 
Supreme Court ruled on 205 cases involving issues related to government searches 
or seizures). 
51. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
52. Id. at 758 n.2.
9
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hospital for treatment.53 Once at the hospital, a police officer 
requested that Schmerber submit to a chemical test of his breath so 
that officers could test for the presence of alcohol.54 Schmerber 
refused to comply with the test.55 After being directed to do so by a 
police officer, a physician took a blood sample from Schmerber—
over Schmerber’s continued objections.56 The analysis of his blood 
showed that Schmerber was intoxicated beyond the legal limit at the 
time of the accident.57 
Schmerber was charged with driving while intoxicated.58 The 
report from the blood analysis was entered into evidence at a trial.59 
Schmerber objected to the introduction of this evidence at trial, 
specifically arguing that the report that revealed his intoxication was 
the product of a search that violated the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments.60 Despite these objections, Schmerber was 
convicted of driving while intoxicated by the State of California, and 
both the state court of appeals and supreme court affirmed his 
conviction.61 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
address his constitutional claims.62 
The Court dispatched with Schmerber’s Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment claims quickly but examined his Fifth and Fourth 
Amendment claims much more closely.63 Schmerber’s argument 
that his right to self-incrimination was violated hinged on the idea 
that by taking a sample of his blood against his will, Schmerber was 
being compelled to provide evidence against himself in a criminal 
case in direct violation of the Fifth Amendment.64 While the Court 
had previously heard at least one case where a plaintiff claimed that 
his Fifth Amendment rights had been violated by state action,65 
because any such cases occurred prior to the incorporation of the 
53. Id.
54. Id. at 765 n.9.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 758–59.






63. See id. at 759–72.
64. See id. at 760.
65. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 79 (1908) (declining to apply
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination to the states). 
10
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Fifth Amendment to the states, this was effectively a matter of first 
impression for the Court.66 The Court ruled broadly on this issue: 
We hold that the privilege protects an accused only from 
being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise 
provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or 
communicative nature, and that the withdrawal of blood 
and use of the analysis in question in this case did not 
involve compulsion to these ends.67 
The Court also heard Schmerber’s Fourth Amendment claim 
and rejected it based on the same grounds.68 The Court again 
treated the claim as an issue of first impression.69 The Court first held 
that, although the Fifth Amendment is not implicated by a forced 
blood draw, the Fourth Amendment “plainly” is.70 The Court first 
discussed the analytical structure behind Fourth Amendment claims 
and declared that its ruling must rest on whether the search in this 
case “respected relevant Fourth Amendment standards of 
reasonableness.”71 The Court next quickly examined the general 
rationales behind warrantless searches incident to arrest and found 
them wanting in Schmerber’s case.72 The Court then discussed the 
general rule allowing officers to perform searches without a warrant 
under emergency situations and found that the facts in Schmerber’s 
particular case justified the warrantless search of his blood.73 Unlike 
its holding on the Fifth Amendment issue, the Court ruled narrowly 
66. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761 (“We therefore must now decide whether the
withdrawal of the blood and admission in evidence of the analysis involved in this 
case violated petitioner’s [Fifth Amendment] privilege.”). 
67. Id.
68. See Briethaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 434 (1957) (holding “that the
generative principles of the Bill of Rights” do not extend the protections of the 
Fourth and Fifth amendments to petitioner’s case through the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
69. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768 (“[W]e write on a clean slate.”).
70. Id. at 767.
71. Id. at 768.
72. Id. at 769–70. The Court first pointed out that because there was plainly
sufficient probable cause, if the policy rationale behind a search incident to arrest 
was implicated, it could simply apply that exception to the general prohibition 
against warrantless searches. Id. at 769. However, the general rationale supporting 
such searches is to allow police to take reasonable steps to confiscate weapons which 
could be used against them and to preserve evidence that would be discovered 
during such a search, and neither of those rationales applied to the facts in 
Schmerber. See id. 
73. Id. at 770–71.
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in regard to Schmerber’s Fourth Amendment argument, holding 
that only the “special facts” of the case warranted the officer’s 
actions.74 
The Court’s holding contained language that confused two very 
different exceptions to the Fourth Amendment prohibition on 
warrantless searches. The Court held that because of the “special 
facts . . . the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in 
this case was an appropriate incident to petitioner’s arrest.”75 Under 
current jurisprudence, the language about “special facts” would be 
construed as a reference to the exigent circumstances exception to 
the Fourth Amendment—which resists categorical rules—and 
instead focuses on the need for the intrusion and the availability of 
a warrant.76 However, the language also justifies the search as 
“incident to petitioner’s arrest,” which could indicate that the test 
was upheld as a search incident to arrest.77 Searches incident to 
arrest are categorical exceptions to the warrant requirement and 
where applicable do not require any case-by-case balancing.78 
In Chimel v. California,79 the Court continued to grapple with 
warrantless searches.80 In that case, police arrested the burglary 
74. Id. at 771.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1564 (2013) (holding that
the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment requires a fact-
intensive case-by-case determination as to whether or not a particular search is 
justified). 
77. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
78. See, e.g., Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2174 (2016) (holding
that searches incident to arrest are either categorically allowed or prohibited, and 
that if they are appropriate, then an officer does not need to make a decision based 
on the totality of the circumstances). 
79. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
80. The Court grappled with many landmark constitutional criminal
procedure cases during the 1960s and into the 1970s. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966) (holding that evidence obtained from a criminal 
defendant through police interrogation without advisement of the suspect’s rights 
is inadmissible under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 
1, 6 (1964) (incorporating the Fifth Amendment protection against the right to self-
incrimination to state courts); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) 
(establishing the requirement under the Sixth Amendment that the states must 
provide legal counsel for certain criminal defendants who lacked the resources to 
acquire counsel themselves); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85, 488 
(1963) (holding that both direct and indirect evidence discovered because of an 
unconstitutional search must be excluded). See generally Eric J. Miller, The Warren 
Court’s Regulatory Revolution in Criminal Procedure, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2010). Because 
12
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suspect in his house.81 They had a warrant for Chimel’s arrest but 
not a warrant to search the house.82 Over Chimel’s objections, police 
searched the entire house as a search incident to arrest and 
discovered evidence that was later admitted at his trial.83 The Court 
granted certiorari to answer the question of whether that search was 
within the scope of a search incident to arrest.84 
The State argued that an older case, United States v. Rabinowitz,85 
should control the outcome in Chimel.86 In Rabinowitz, federal 
officers searched the one-room office that a suspect was arrested in, 
as well as the desk, safe, and file cabinets in the office.87 The Court 
held that police had “[t]he right ‘to search the place where the arrest 
is made in order to find and seize things connected with the 
crime.’”88 The Court in Chimel explained that “Rabinowitz ha[d] 
come to stand for the proposition . . . that a warrantless search 
‘incident to a lawful arrest’ may generally extend to the area that is 
considered to be in the ‘possession’ or under the ‘control’ of the 
person arrested.”89 
The Court pushed back on this expansion of police power and 
held that officer safety was the prime justification for the search-
incident-to-arrest principle and that the preservation of evidence was 
a secondary concern.90 The Court held that it is reasonable for an 
officer to search the person of the arrestee to “remove any weapons 
that the [arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect 
his escape.”91 The Court also held that it is categorically reasonable 
to search the area into which “an arrestee might reach in order to 
of the vast amount of material specifically addressing implied-consent laws and 
searches incident to arrest, Terry stops and other important but not directly related 
cases are beyond the scope of this Note. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
81. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753–54.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 754. The district court held that the arrest warrant was invalid due to
a lack of sufficient probable cause but did not exclude the evidence that police 
discovered in Chimel’s house, as the officers were acting in good faith. Id. at 754–
55. The Supreme Court declined to address the validity of the arrest. Id. at 755.
84. Id.
85. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
86. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 759.
87. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 59.
88. Id. at 61.
89. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 760.
90. Id. at 763.
91. Id. (alteration in original).
13
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grab a weapon.”92 Because such a search is reasonable, the officer 
could also seize any potential evidence discovered during this search 
in order to prevent its “concealment or destruction.”93 Because 
Chimel’s entire home could not be defined as such an area, the 
evidence obtained in the search had to be suppressed, and Chimel’s 
conviction reversed.94 
The Court again addressed the proper scope of a search 
incident to arrest four years later in United States v. Robinson.95 In that 
case, the petitioner was stopped based on uncontested probable 
cause for a minor traffic offence.96 The arresting officer searched 
Robinson and pulled a “crumpled up cigarette package” out of the 
left breast pocket of his coat.97 Upon further inspection, the 
arresting officer discovered fourteen capsules of heroin in the 
cigarette package.98 This heroin was admitted as evidence at trial and 
subsequently used to convict Robinson of possession of heroin and 
facilitation of concealment of heroin.99 At issue was the fact that at 
no point did the arresting officer have any fear or apprehension that 
Robinson was armed or dangerous; the search was entirely motivated 
by the potential for the preservation of evidence.100 
Lacking this justification, the court of appeals excluded the 
heroin and held that the search was unreasonable.101 The Supreme 
Court reversed and, contrary to the language in Chimel, held that the 
preservation of evidence was just as important a justification for the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception as officer safety.102 For the first 
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 768.
95. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
96. Id. at 220.
97. Id. at 222–23.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 219–20.
100. See id. at 236. 
 101. See United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
(reasoning that the search went beyond the scope of a valid search incident to arrest 
because “there was no suggestion that [the arresting officer] believed it to be a 
weapon or believed himself to be in danger”), rev’d, 414 U.S. 218. 
102. Compare Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234 (“The justification or reason for the 
authority to search incident to a lawful arrest rests quite as much on the need to 
disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody as it does on the need to 
preserve evidence on his person for later use at trial.”), with Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762 
(holding that the scope of a search incident to arrest is the area from which an 
arrestee might procure a weapon). 
14
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time, the Court also held that a search incident to arrest is 
categorically reasonable and requires no justification beyond the 
probable cause that is required for a legal arrest.103 
Jumping forward forty years, the Court recently granted 
certiorari on a case that applied Fourth Amendment principles to a 
situation that the founding fathers could never have anticipated. In 
Riley v. California,104 the Court addressed two cases in which police 
searched an arrestee incident to arrest and discovered information 
stored on the arrestee’s cell phone, which was accessed without a 
warrant and later used as evidence at trial.105 The Court noted that, 
absent historical guidance, it is the Court’s duty to balance “the 
degree to which [a search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy 
[against] the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests.”106 The Court based its holding 
on the historical basis for searches incident to arrest generally.107 It 
held that data stored in cell phones cannot possibly be used as a 
weapon to attack the arresting officer.108 The Court rejected the 
argument that accessing the data could allow officers to avoid 
collateral danger, because that justification could apply to any 
potential warrantless search.109 
The Court further held that the preservation of evidence, 
though a more compelling interest, was also insufficient justification 
to allow these searches incident to arrest.110 The Court held that the 
main danger asserted by the State, that a third party could either 
wipe the data on the phone or encrypt it remotely, was “distinct” 
from reasoning in earlier cases, and the danger was thus 
unpersuasive.111 
On the other side of the balancing test, the Court concluded 
that even though an arrestee had a reduced expectation of privacy 
 103. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (“We do not think the long line of authorities 
. . . requires such a case-by-case adjudication.”). 
104. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 2484 (alteration in original) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 
U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). 
107. See id. at 2485. 
108. Id. 
109. See id. 
110. See id. at 2486. 
111. See id. (“We have also been given little reason to believe that either problem 
is prevalent. The briefing reveals only a couple of anecdotal examples of remote 
wiping triggered by an arrest.”). 
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simply due to being arrested, the intrusion into the privacy interests 
of the arrestee in the case at hand was still unreasonable.112 The 
Court referenced the fact that smart phones are essentially 
“minicomputers” that are materially different from the crumpled up 
pack of cigarettes in Robinson.113 
The State presented an alternative argument that searches of an 
arrestee’s cell phone should be permissible when the arresting 
officer has probable cause to believe that the phone contains 
evidence of the crime for which the suspect was arrested.114 The State 
based the argument on the reasoning of an earlier case, Arizona v. 
Gant,115 which created an addition to the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception regarding vehicles.116 The Gant Court held that when a 
suspect is arrested in a motor vehicle, a search of that vehicle is 
constitutional as a search incident to arrest when “it is ‘reasonable to 
believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in 
the vehicle.’”117 
The government argued that there should be a similar addition 
for cell phones when there is probable cause to believe that there is 
evidence on a seized phone that is relevant to the crime for which 
the suspect was arrested.118 The Court rejected this argument, 
holding that motor vehicles present “heightened law enforcement 
needs” that cell phones do not and that in virtually any situation 
where a cell phone was seized incident to arrest an officer could 
come up with sufficient probable cause to justify a full search of the 
data on the phone.119 
112. See id. at 2488. 
 113. Id. at 2488–89, 2492 (noting the “immense storage capacity” of 
smartphones and the “virtually unlimited” potential for collection of private data). 
114. Id. at 2492 (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009)). 
115. 556 U.S. 332. 
116. Id. at 343. 
117. Id. (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004)). 
118. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492. 
119. See id. (“It would be a particularly inexperienced or unimaginative law 
enforcement officer who could not come up with several reasons to suppose 
evidence of just about any crime could be found on a cell phone.”). The Court also 
summarily rejected alternate justifications, holding that restricting the scope of the 
search within the data of the cell phone would not provide a meaningful constraint 
on officers; that even viewing the call logs would reveal personal information, such 
as the identities of the persons that the owner of the cell phone was calling; and that 
allowing a search of any data on a cell phone that police would have had the 
possibility of finding through a search of an address book or other pre-digital 
counterpart would be an unworkable and unjustifiable diminution of privacy. See id. 
16
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B. The Skinner and King Decisions: Providing a Framework for 
Analysis of Warrantless Testing 
Unlike most of the cases discussed in this Note, the next 
important case to the development of DWI implied-consent law, 
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n,120 was not a criminal case but 
a civil one. In that case, the Railway Labor Executives’ Association 
challenged certain regulations promulgated by the Federal Railroad 
Administration.121 The challenged regulations required railroad 
companies to take blood and urine tests from employees after major 
accidents and authorized railroads to administer breath or urine 
tests to employees who violated safety rules.122 
The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the 
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.123 The 
railroad employees argued that the potential searches were 
unconstitutional because they made certain employees subject to a 
mandatory search after a major crash without a warrant or any 
individualized suspicion.124 The Court found the privacy interests 
involved to be slight, as compared to the “compelling” government 
interest in safely regulating the industry.125 The Court therefore 
upheld the regulations involving warrantless testing of blood, 
breath, and urine as categorically constitutional.126 Skinner is 
especially important because, unlike any other Supreme Court case, 
the Skinner Court had to balance the reasonableness and intrusion 
involved in breath, blood, and urine tests, all in the same case.127 
120. 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
121. Id. at 612. 
122. Id. at 609–12.  The Court determined, as a threshold matter, that the 
collection of such samples constituted a search that implicated the Fourth 
Amendment. Id. at 614–16. The Court reasoned that even though the search was 
performed by private railroad companies, because of the compelled nature of the 
testing required and the government interest and involvement in the testing, the 
searches implicated the Fourth Amendment. Id. 
 123. Id. at 619 (“For the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and 
seizures, but only those that are unreasonable.”). 
 124. Id. at 621–22 (noting that warrants supported by individualized suspicion 
served to protect citizens from “the random or arbitrary acts of government agents,” 
and concluding that such arbitrariness was not a concern in this case). 
125. Id. at 628. 
126. Id. at 603. 
127. See id. at 625–28. 
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In 2013, the Court granted certiorari on two cases that wrestled 
with significant Fourth Amendment issues.128 In Maryland v. King,129 
an arrestee challenged a Maryland law incorporating DNA tests into 
standard booking procedures.130 Police arrested King on assault 
charges and, as part of routine procedure, took a warrantless DNA 
sample via cotton swab from his inner cheek.131 When the sample 
was analyzed, King’s DNA was matched to semen that had been 
recovered from an unsolved rape that occurred six years prior.132 
After King’s conviction for that rape, the Maryland Court of Appeals 
ruled that the DNA swab was an unconstitutional search and 
reversed.133 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
decide the question of the statute’s constitutionality.134 
The Supreme Court first held that the DNA testing clearly 
constituted a search of the person and thus implicated the Fourth 
Amendment.135 The Court reasoned that, as an administrative 
search, requiring a warrant for the test in this case would be a near 
pointless exercise, noting that “in light of the standardized nature of 
the tests and the minimal discretion vested in those charged with 
administering the program, there are virtually no facts for a neutral 
magistrate to evaluate.”136 The Court then engaged in a rigorous 
balancing test to evaluate the reasonableness of the search.137 The 
Court held that the government interest in correctly identifying the 
persons whom it held in custody was compelling for four reasons.138 
 128. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (holding that a warrantless 
DNA swab incident to arrest was constitutional as an inventory search); Missouri v. 
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) (holding that the natural dissipation of alcohol 
from a suspect’s bloodstream did not constitute a per se exigency for purposes of 
Fourth Amendment analysis). 
129. 133 S. Ct. 1958. 
 130. Id. at 1965 (“As part of a routine booking procedure for serious offenses, 
[King’s] DNA sample was taken by [buccal swab].”). 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 580 (2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1958. 
134. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1965. While every state has a statute authorizing DNA 
collection from convicted felons, Maryland was one of twenty-eight states, in 
addition to the federal government, that collected DNA from some or all arrestees 
prior to a conviction. Id. at 1968. 
135. Id. at 1968–69. 
 136. Id. at 1970 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 
(1989)). 
137. Id. at 1969. 
138. Id. 
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The Court held that identification by way of DNA analysis was crucial 
for the purposes of thwarting attempts by the arrestee to conceal his 
identity,139 protecting the safety of officers and existing detainees,140 
ensuring that the government can produce individuals for trial,141 
and assessing the potential danger that the individual would present 
if allowed to be released on bail.142 The Court concluded that these 
interests outweighed the privacy interests of the individuals 
involved.143 The Court held that arrestees have a diminished 
expectation of privacy in all cases144 and further held that the search 
was minimal because “[a] gentle rub along the inside of the cheek 
does not break the skin, and it ‘involves virtually no risk, trauma, or 
pain.’”145 
The Court declared that DNA testing had the “unmatched 
potential” to serve the government’s interest in identifying the 
persons whom it had arrested, which deserved “great weight.”146 It 
also specifically noted that the methodology used to identify 
individuals using their DNA does not reveal any genetic traits of the 
individual.147 The Court further noted that the DNA collection 
statute itself limits any further use of the DNA sample obtained from 
 139. Id. at 1971 (quoting Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 336 
(2012)) (“An ‘arrestee may be carrying a false ID or lie about his identity,’ and 
‘criminal history records . . . can be inaccurate or incomplete.’”). 
 140. Id. at 1972 (analogizing to a visual inspection of new arrestees for gang 
tattoos or other markings that would indicate that an individual is particularly 
violent). 
 141. Id. at 1973. The argument appears to be that if an individual knew that he 
had committed a previous crime and was arrested for a minor offense, then he 
would flee the jurisdiction the moment that he was released on that minor charge. 
Id. This begs the question: if such an individual were inclined to flee because he had 
committed an unsolved crime, then why would he not have done so before 
committing the later minor offense in this hypothetical? 
 142. Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC., § 4-216(f)(1)(G) (West 2013) 
(current version at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-216(e)(1)(G) (West 2016))) 
(“Knowing that the defendant is wanted for a previous violent crime based on DNA 
identification is especially probative of the court’s consideration of ‘the danger of 
the defendant to the alleged victim, another person, or the community.’”). 
143. Id. at 1980. 
 144. Id. at 1978 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979)) (“The 
expectations of privacy of an individual taken into police custody ‘necessarily [are] 
of a diminished scope.’”). 
145. Id. at 1979 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)). 
146. Id. at 1977. 
147. Id. at 1979 (noting that the CODIS loci tested currently cannot reveal such 
information). 
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the arrestees.148 Interestingly, the Court accepted at face value the 
contention that the DNA samples that the State obtained would not 
be used for any purpose other than identification of the arrestee.149 
Instead, the Court merely noted that “[i]f in the future police 
analyze samples to determine, for instance, an arrestee’s 
predisposition for a particular disease or other hereditary factors not 
relevant to identity, that case would present additional privacy 
concerns not present here.”150 The Court also reasoned that DNA 
testing in this context was analogous to the current practice of 
fingerprinting suspects upon arrest.151 Justice Scalia wrote a scathing 
dissent,152 concluding with a hope that a future Court would reverse 
the opinion.153 
C. DWI Litigation Is Back at the Supreme Court 
The same year the Court decided Maryland v. King, the Court 
took on a case that sparked a flurry of DWI litigation. In Missouri v. 
McNeely,154 McNeely was pulled over on suspicion of driving while 
impaired after the officer witnessed him driving erratically.155 
McNeely failed other field sobriety tests and refused to provide a 
breath sample for a preliminary breath test.156 The officer placed 
McNeely under arrest and began to transport him back to the 
station.157 Once McNeely informed the officer that he would again 
refuse to provide a breath sample at the station, the officer diverted 
 148. Id. at 1980 (quoting NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 136 (2011)) (noting 
that “a statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures generally 
[assuages] privacy concerns” (internal quotations omitted)). Interestingly, the 
Court appears to have taken a step back from this position. Cf. Birchfield v. North 
Dakota, 36 S. Ct. 2160, 2178 (2016) (“Even if the law enforcement agency is 
precluded from testing the [retained blood sample] for any purpose other than to 
measure BAC, the potential remains and may result in anxiety for the person 
tested.”). 
149. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 1971–72. 
152. Id. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I doubt that the proud men who wrote 
the charter of our liberties would have been so eager to open their mouths for royal 
inspection.”). 
153. Id. at 1989–90. 
154. 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). 
155. Id. at 1556. 
156. Id. at 1556–57. 
157. Id. 
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McNeely to a hospital to obtain a sample of McNeely’s blood.158 At 
the hospital, the officer read the informed-consent advisory to 
McNeely and informed him that test-refusal would result in license 
revocation and be used as evidence in a subsequent prosecution.159 
McNeely still refused to consent to testing.160 The officer directed a 
hospital technician to take a blood sample anyway, which revealed 
that McNeely’s blood alcohol concentration was almost twice the 
legal limit.161 
McNeely was subsequently charged with driving while 
intoxicated. He moved to suppress the results of the blood test on 
the grounds that the blood draw constituted a warrantless search that 
was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.162 He argued that the 
search could not be justified by the exigent circumstances exception 
to the warrant requirement.163 The district court agreed that the 
search violated the Fourth Amendment, and the Missouri Supreme 
Court affirmed.164 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the 
issue of whether the natural dissipation of alcohol from the body 
constituted a per se exigency so as to justify states in either 
conducting warrantless tests or in criminalizing refusal of warrantless 
tests.165 
The Supreme Court held that the exigent circumstances 
exception requires a case-by-case analysis that is dependent on the 
totality of the circumstances.166 The Court maintained that it would 
not “depart from careful case-by-case assessment of exigency and 
adopt the categorical rule proposed by the State.”167 While the Court 
cited to several exigent circumstance cases that clearly use such 
language,168 there are exceptions to the warrant requirement that 







165. Id. at 1558. 
166. Id. at 1563. 
167. Id. at 1561. 
168. See id. at 1559 (first citing Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001) 
(“concluding that a warrantless seizure of a person to prevent him from returning 
to his trailer to destroy hidden contraband was reasonable ‘[i]n the circumstances 
of the case before us’”); then citing Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) 
(“holding that a limited warrantless search of a suspect’s fingernails to preserve 
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appear to constitute per se exigencies.169 Further, it appears that for 
some cases, the language that the McNeely Court used to describe the 
Court’s past reasoning does not necessarily match with the language 
used in the actual cases.170 Importantly, the Court’s holding in 
McNeely abrogated Minnesota case law upholding the 
constitutionality of the State’s implied-consent laws as being justified 
by the “single-factor” exigent circumstance of the “rapid, natural 
dissipation of alcohol in the blood.”171 
In 2016, just three years after McNeely, the Supreme Court again 
grappled with the issue of DWI test refusal. In Birchfield v. North 
Dakota,172 the Court held that warrantless breath tests were 
categorically constitutional incident to a valid arrest for driving while 
impaired but warrantless blood tests were not.173 The case involved 
three defendants, each with a slightly different set of facts but all of 
whom challenged the constitutionality of their states’ implied-
consent laws.174 The issue that the Court granted certiorari on was 
evidence that the suspect was trying to rub off was justified ‘[o]n the facts of this 
case’”)). 
 169. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“One exigency 
obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously 
injured or threatened with such injury.”); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511 
(1978) (“[E]ntry to fight a fire requires no warrant, and . . . once in the building, 
officials may remain there for a reasonable time to investigate . . . .”); United States 
v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (holding that a suspect fleeing from a public area
into her private house did not require the police to halt their chase, as the flight 
constituted a “hot pursuit”). This seems to directly contradict the Court’s 
description of exigent circumstance jurisprudence in McNeely as always relying on a 
case-by-case analysis, as these cases appear to create categorical exigent 
circumstances that are exempt from the warrant requirement. 
 170. Compare McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1559 (“Our decision in Schmerber applied this 
totality of the circumstances approach.”), with Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 
(1966) (analyzing the totality of the circumstances to justify the search and holding 
that given the special facts, the search “was an appropriate incident to petitioner’s 
arrest” (emphasis added)). 
 171. State v. Shriner, 751 N.W.2d 538, 549–50 (Minn. 2008), abrogated by McNeely, 
133 S. Ct. 1552. 
172. 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016). 
173. Id. at 2185. 
 174. Id. at 2170. Danny Birchfield was convicted of DWI test-refusal in North 
Dakota for refusing to consent to a blood test after driving his car off of a highway. 
Id. William Bernard was convicted of DWI test-refusal in Minnesota for refusing to 
consent to a breath test. Id. at 2171. Steve Beylund had his driver’s license revoked 
for DWI in North Dakota after a blood test revealed that he had been driving with 
a blood alcohol concentration more than three times the legal limit. Id. at 2171–72. 
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essentially the same for all three cases: was a warrantless test, of 
breath or blood, permissible as a search incident to arrest?175 
The Court began its analysis with a general discussion of the 
implied warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment before 
moving on to the specific issue in the case, the search-incident-to-
arrest exception.176 The Court went through the historical basis for 
the exception before deciding that there was no historical analogue 
to chemical tests for blood-alcohol-concentration.177 Therefore it 
concluded that, consistent with Riley, the proper analysis for whether 
the exception applies in a certain situation should be determined 
“by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which [a search] 
intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree 
to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.”178 
In regard to breath tests, the Court reaffirmed its declaration 
from Skinner that they “do not ‘implicat[e] significant privacy 
concerns.’”179 Its analysis focused primarily on the degree of physical 
intrusion into the body that the testing required.180 The Court held 
that even though the test requires the suspect to insert the 
mouthpiece of the testing machine into his or her mouth, there was 
nothing “painful or strange” about the test.181 Importantly, the Court 
directly compared the breath search at issue in that case with the 
DNA swab in Maryland v. King—despite the fact that the two searches 
were justified by different exceptions to the warrant requirement.182 
The Court went on to note that breath tests only reveal one 
piece of information and do not place a sample of any biological 
material in the hands of police.183 Again, it contrasted the testing in 
175. Id. at 2172. 
176. Id. at 2173 (citing Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011)). 
177. Id. at 2176. 
178. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 
(2014)). 
179. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989)). 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 2177. The Court also held that people hold no “possessory interest” 
in the air in their lungs, regardless of the fact that the test requires “alveolar,” or 
“deep lung” air. Id. 
 182. Id. (quoting Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013)) (describing 
“the process of collecting a DNA sample by rubbing a swab on the inside of a 
person’s cheek as a ‘negligible’ intrusion”). 
183. Id. 
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this case with the test in King.184 Finally, the Court noted that breath 
tests are not likely to cause an enhancement to the embarrassment 
that is already “inherent in any arrest” and that after an arrest, “the 
individual’s expectation of privacy is necessarily diminished.”185 
To contrast, the Court noted that blood tests are different 
because they require “‘piercing the skin’ and extract[ing] a part of 
the subject’s body.”186 The decision also included the dramatic point 
that “while humans exhale air from their lungs many times per 
minute, humans do not continually shed blood.”187 The Court 
finished its analysis of the intrusion of blood tests by noting that a 
blood test places a sample into the hands of law enforcement.188 
On the other hand, the Court stated that the government has a 
“paramount interest . . . in preserving the safety of . . . public 
highways.”189 The Court described the damage that the country 
suffers from drunk driving every year: 
Alcohol consumption is a leading cause of traffic fatalities 
and injuries. During the past decade, annual fatalities in 
drunk-driving accidents ranged from 13,582 deaths in 2005 
to 9,865 deaths in 2011. The most recent data report a total 
of 9,967 such fatalities in 2014—on average, one death 
every 53 minutes. Our cases have long recognized the 
“carnage” and “slaughter” caused by drunk drivers.190 
The Court noted that, contrary to Justice Sotomayor’s assertion 
in her dissent, the State’s interests do not end once the drunk driver 
is arrested.191 Instead, the Court stated that the interest continues 
through the suspect’s conviction, because the State has an interest 
in deterring other potential drunk drivers from getting behind the 
wheel.192 
The Court also noted that criminal consequences for DWI test 
refusal grew out of a desire to curb the “most dangerous 
offenders”193—in other words, those who drive with a blood alcohol 
184. Id. (citing King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967–68). 
185. Id. 




189. Id. (quoting Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979)). 
190. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
191. Id. at 2178–79. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 2179. 
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content well above the legal limit and DWI recidivists who faced the 
harshest consequences for a conviction for driving while impaired.194 
The problem with purely civil sanctions for test refusal, the Court 
noted, was that the most dangerous offenders had a strong incentive 
to refuse a test that would likely lead to harsh criminal penalties 
when they could simply refuse to comply with the test and only have 
to face a license revocation.195 The Court further reasoned that 
requiring a warrant for every driving while impaired arrest was a 
practical impossibility, as police effectuate more than 1.1 million 
such arrests every year.196 
The Court then noted that due to the interests involved and the 
categorical nature of the search-incident-to-arrest exception, the 
burden was on the petitioners, not the State, to show that there was 
a “special need” for warrants in these situations.197 This implies that 
the categorical nature of searches incident to arrest have a 
presumption of reasonableness. The Court then went through the 
possible benefits of requiring a warrant for every arrest on suspicion 
of driving while intoxicated, such as limiting intrusion on privacy.198 
However, the Court concluded that due to the similarity of the facts 
in most DWI arrests and the categorically limited scope of the search, 
requiring the police to obtain a warrant for every arrest on suspicion 
of DWI “would impose a substantial burden but no commensurate 
benefit.”199 Additionally, the Court concluded that given the 
government interests involved and the “slight” impact of breath tests 
on privacy, warrantless breath tests are categorically constitutional 
incident to arrest for DWI.200 
The Court reached the opposite conclusion on blood tests.201 
The Court held that the reasonableness of the “more intrusive” test 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. See id. at 2180 (“The number of arrests every year for driving under the 
influence is enormous—more than 1.1 million in 2014.”). 
197. Id. at 2181. 
 198. Id. (“First, [warrants] ensure that a search is not carried out unless a neutral 
magistrate makes an independent determination that there is probable cause to 
believe that evidence will be found. Second, if the magistrate finds probable cause, 
the warrant limits the intrusion on privacy by specifying the scope of the search—
that is, the area that can be searched and the items that can be sought.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
199. Id. at 2181–82. 
200. Id. at 2184. 
201. Id. 
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“must be judged in light of the availability of the less invasive 
alternative of a breath test.”202 Further, the Court noted, 
Respondents have offered no satisfactory justification for 
demanding the more intrusive alternative without a 
warrant. . . . [P]olice have other measures at their disposal 
when they have reason to believe that a motorist may be 
under the influence of some other substance (for example, 
if a breath test indicates that a clearly impaired motorist has 
little if any alcohol in his blood). Nothing prevents the 
police from seeking a warrant for a blood test when there 
is sufficient time to do so in the particular circumstances or 
from relying on the exigent circumstances exception to the 
warrant requirement when there is not. . . . Because breath 
tests are significantly less intrusive than blood tests and in 
most cases amply serve law enforcement interests, we 
conclude that a breath test, but not a blood test, may be 
administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for 
drunk driving.203 
Thus, the Court relied exclusively on the greater intrusiveness 
of blood tests to hold that warrantless blood tests are 
unconstitutional as searches incident to arrest, absent a case-by-case 
analysis of the exigencies of the situation. 
IV. STATE V. THOMPSON
A. Facts of the Case 
On April 13, 2012, at around 1:00 a.m., Ryan Thompson drove 
away from a bar in Owatonna, MN.204 An officer, who was watching 
the parking lot of this bar, saw Thompson’s car “jump the curb and 
then stop quickly before reversing and leaving the parking lot.”205 As 
the vehicle left the parking lot, it “cut the corner short and crossed 
the center line.”206 The officer watching the parking lot then 
initiated a traffic stop.207 After Thompson stopped and the officer 
approached his car, Thompson informed the officer that he did not 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 2184–85. 
204. State v. Thompson, 873 N.W.2d 873, 876 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015), aff’d, 886 
N.W.2d 224 (Minn. 2016). 
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have his driver’s license with him and produced the license of the 
passenger of the car instead.208 The officer was able to identify 
Thompson by his name and date of birth.209 The officer later 
testified that there was an “overwhelming odor” of alcohol coming 
from the vehicle and that Thompson had “watery and glassy eyes.”210 
Thompson admitted to having a single beer.211 
The officer then asked Thompson to submit to several field 
sobriety tests, all of which he failed.212 Thompson also failed a 
preliminary breath test at the scene,213 after which the officer placed 
him under arrest for suspicion of driving while impaired.214 The 
officer then transported Thompson to the Steele County Detention 
Center and gave Thompson a phone, a telephone book, and a 
directory of attorneys.215 After leaving one voicemail, Thompson told 
the officers that he was done attempting to contact an attorney.216 
The officer then read the implied consent advisory to Thompson 
and requested that he take a blood or urine test.217 Thompson 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 226–27. 
211. Id. at 227. 
212. State v. Thompson, 873 N.W.2d 873, 876 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015), aff’d, 886 
N.W.2d 224. 
 213. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 227. Under Minnesota law, when a peace officer 
has reason to believe that a person has driven or operated a vehicle under the 
influence of alcohol, the officer may request that the person submit to a 
“preliminary screening test,” which tests a sample of the person’s breath at the 
scene. MINN. STAT. § 169A.41 (2016). This test will indicate an approximate level of 
intoxication, but the results are not considered reliable enough to be evidence of 
intoxication. See Windschitl v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 355 N.W.2d 146, 149 (Minn. 
1984). This test may be used for a number of purposes (primarily to determine 
whether or not an arrest should be made), but it cannot be used to establish the 
blood alcohol content of the suspect in court during a prosecution for driving while 
intoxicated. MINN. STAT. § 169A.41, subdiv. 2. 
214. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 227. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. Under Minnesota law, officers who arrest a person suspected of driving 
under the influence have two choices to offer the arrestee. MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, 
subdiv. 3. They can require the suspect to take a breath test, and if they do so, they 
are not required to offer, or accept, an alternate test. See Carlson v. Comm’r of Pub. 
Safety, 357 N.W.2d 391, 392 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). The other choice is to request 
that the suspect take either a blood or urine test. MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subdiv. 3. 
If police request either of these testing methods and the suspect refuses, then police 
must offer an alternate method of testing before the state can either bring criminal 
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refused both alternatives, stating, “I don’t think I’ve been prosecuted 
properly.”218 The State subsequently charged Thompson with one 
count each of second-degree test refusal,219 third-degree driving 
while impaired,220 obstruction of legal process,221 and driving over 
the centerline.222 
B. The Lower Courts’ Decisions and Reasoning 
At the district court, Thompson moved for dismissal of the test-
refusal charge, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional as 
applied on the grounds that it violated his substantive due process 
rights and the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.223 Regarding 
the due process claim, he claimed that a warrantless search of his 
blood or urine was an unconstitutional search under the Fourth 
Amendment that violated his substantive due process right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures.224 He argued that because 
the search was be unconstitutional, refusing to submit to it could not 
be criminalized.225 
The unconstitutional conditions argument is more complex. 
Under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the government 
cannot condition a privilege on the relinquishment of certain 
constitutional rights.226 In this case, Thompson argued that 
Minnesota’s implied-consent laws condition the privilege of driving 
on the relinquishment of the Fourth Amendment right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures. Because both the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court 
charges or revoke the license of the suspect for test refusal. See Johnson v. Comm’r 
of Pub. Safety, 887 N.W.2d 281, 290–95 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016). 
 218. State v. Thompson, 873 N.W.2d 873, 876 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015), aff’d, 886 
N.W.2d 224. 
219. MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.20, subdiv. 2, 169A.25. 
220. Id. §§ 169A.20, subdiv. 1(1), 169A.26. 
221. Id. § 609.50, subdivs. 1(2), 2(3). 
222. Id. § 169.18, subdiv. 1; Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 227. 
223. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 227. 
224. State v. Thompson, 873 N.W.2d 873, 876–77 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015), aff’d, 
886 N.W.2d 224. 
225. Id. 
 226. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 
1426 (1989) (“[T]he doctrine serves to protect only those rights that depend on 
some sort of exercise of autonomous choice by the rightholder, such as individual 
rights to speech, exercise of religion or privacy . . . .”). 
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ruled on this case on due process grounds, neither court addressed 
Thompson’s unconstitutional conditions argument.227 
The district court denied Thompson’s motion for dismissal 
based on the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. 
Bernard.228 Bernard involved a similar challenge to the DWI test-
refusal statute on warrantless tests of a suspect’s breath.229 The 
Minnesota Supreme Court held in Bernard that when a suspect is 
placed under lawful arrest for suspicion of driving while impaired, a 
warrantless breath test is categorically permissible as a search 
incident to arrest.230 Thus, because a warrantless breath test under 
those circumstances is constitutional, it is also constitutional to 
criminalize refusal of the test.231 The Bernard court did not rule on 
either urine or blood tests and declined to express any opinion on 
the matter.232 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals disagreed with the district 
court. The court of appeals found that Bernard was not dispositive on 
the issue of blood or urine tests and held that the test-refusal statute 
is unconstitutional as applied to both blood and urine.233 Instead of 
Bernard, the court of appeals leaned heavily on another opinion that 
it had released just two months prior, State v. Trahan.234 In Trahan, 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled that warrantless blood tests 
incident to arrest for driving while intoxicated were 
unconstitutional, and therefore the DWI test-refusal statute was 
unconstitutional as well.235 
Basing its reasoning on Trahan, the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
held that urine tests are more like blood than breath tests and 
therefore are not permissible as searches incident to arrest.236 The 
227. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at n.9; Thompson, 873 N.W.2d at 880. 
 228. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 227 (citing State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762 
(2015), aff’d sub nom. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016)). 
229. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 764. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 768 (“[T]he question of a blood or urine test incident to arrest is not 
before us . . . . The differences between a blood test and a breath test are material, 
and not the least of those differences is the less-invasive nature of breath testing.”). 
 233. State v. Thompson, 873 N.W.2d 873, 878 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015), aff’d, 886 
N.W.2d 224. 
 234. Id. at 876 (citing State v. Trahan, 870 N.W.2d 396 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015), 
aff’d, 886 N.W.2d 216 (Minn. 2016)). 
235. Trahan, 870 N.W.2d at 401. 
236. Thompson, 873 N.W.2d at 879. 
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court reasoned that because warrantless urine tests could not be 
justified as searches incident to arrest, the test-refusal statute 
implicated Thompson’s substantive due process right to be free from 
unreasonable searches, and strict scrutiny was the appropriate 
framework for an analysis of the DWI test-refusal statute.237 The 
Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that the State did have a 
compelling interest in keeping impaired drivers off of its roads, 
which satisfied the first prong of the strict scrutiny analysis.238 But it 
held that because there were alternatives available to the State, such 
as breath tests, the statute was not narrowly tailored to serve that 
interest.239 
Upon review, the Minnesota Supreme Court was critical of the 
analysis of the Minnesota Court of Appeals. The higher court 
determined that because a specifically enumerated fundamental 
right, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, 
was implicated, a substantive due process analysis was inappropriate 
and contrary to precedent.240 However, while it disagreed with the 
reasoning of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court affirmed the decision and held that a warrantless 
urine test was not constitutionally permissible as a search incident to 
arrest.241 The court reasoned that while the urine tests are more like 
breath tests than blood tests when examined for their level of 
intrusiveness, urine tests implicate more privacy interests than 
breath tests or blood tests and are thus overall more like blood 
tests.242 It also reasoned that because breath tests adequately serve 
the State’s interest in protecting the public from the danger of 
impaired drivers, the scales are further tipped against the 
reasonableness of warrantless urine tests.243 
237. Id. at 879–80. 
238. Id. at 880. 
239. Id. 
240. State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224, 230 n.4 (Minn. 2016) (quoting Cty. of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998)) (“[W]here a particular Amendment 
provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular 
sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 
substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.”). 
241. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 233. 
242. Id. at 231–32. 
243. Id. at 233. 
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V. ANALYSIS: THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT GOT IT WRONG 
To analyze the court’s decision in Thompson, this Part first begins 
with a discussion of the DWI test-refusal statute and what is required 
to convict someone under the law. Next, this Part critically examines 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s balancing of privacy interests 
against public interests. Finally, this Part discusses the purposes of 
the warrant requirement as the United States Supreme Court laid 
out in Birchfield and concludes that the Thompson decision does not 
serve these purposes. 
A. Understanding the Law 
Minnesota’s implied-consent law states that any individual who 
“drives, operates, or is in physical control of a motor vehicle within 
this state or on any boundary water” consents to a chemical test for 
the limited purpose of determining whether or not he or she is 
under the influence of intoxicating chemicals.244 A number of 
conditions need to be met before an individual is subject to a 
chemical test to determine intoxication.245 The officer requesting 
the test must have probable cause to place the suspect under arrest 
for “driving, operating, or [being] in physical control of a motor 
vehicle” while under the influence, and one of the following 
conditions must be present: 
(1) the person has been lawfully placed under arrest 
for violation of section 169A.20 [driving while impaired] or 
an ordinance in conformity with it; 
(2) the person has been involved in a motor vehicle 
accident or collision resulting in property damage, 
personal injury, or death; 
(3) the person has refused to take the screening test 
provided for by section 169A.41 (preliminary screening 
test); or 
(4) the [preliminary] screening test was administered 
and indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more.246 
244. MINN. STAT. § 169A.51 (2014). 
 245. All of these conditions are necessary, but not sufficient, before an 
individual can be prosecuted for test refusal. See id. 
246. Id. § 169A.51, subdiv. 1(b). Additionally, if the person is “driving, 
operating, or in physical control” of a commercial motor vehicle, there are no other 
requirements, and a chemical test is required simply based on an officer’s 
determination of probable cause that the person is under the influence. Id. 
§ 169A.51, subdiv. 1(c).
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Under the statute, once these conditions are met, suspects are 
obligated to take a chemical test of their breath, blood, or urine, 
depending on the officer’s request.247 Only then, if they refuse to 
take such a test, could a suspect be prosecuted for DWI test-refusal.248 
Further, Birchfield bars the State of Minnesota from prosecuting 
individuals for refusing to consent to a blood test incident to arrest 
for driving while impaired.249 
A key issue in an analysis of the constitutionality of this statute 
is the behavior that the statute punishes. This is because the goal of 
the statute is one step removed from the behavior that it is 
attempting to regulate; that is, individuals driving while under the 
influence of alcohol or another intoxicating substance. A conviction 
for a DWI test refusal is not a conviction for the act of driving while 
impaired, but rather a conviction for refusing a search.250 As such, 
courts have correctly focused their inquiry on the constitutionality 
of the searches that states have chosen to criminalize refusal of; if the 
searches are not constitutional exercises of government authority, 
then individuals cannot be punished for refusing to comply with 
them.251 
B. The Court Gave Too Much Weight to the Privacy Interests Involved 
In order to determine whether a warrantless urine test is a valid 
search incident to arrest for driving while intoxicated, the Thompson 
court engaged in a balancing of the government interests involved 
against the privacy interests implicated by the search.252 The court 
first laid out the privacy interests involved in the case: “the level of 
physical intrusion” required by the search, “the ability of the State to 
retain a sample containing other personal information,” and the 
247. See id. § 169A.20, subdiv. 2. 
248. See id. §§ 169A.20, subdiv. 2, 169A.51. 
249. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (holding that 
warrantless blood tests are not constitutional as searches incident to arrest). 
 250. See MINN. STAT. § 169A.20, subdiv. 2 (“It is a crime for any person to refuse 
to submit to a chemical test of the person’s blood, breath, or urine.”). 
 251. See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2172 (“If such warrantless searches comport with 
the Fourth Amendment, it follows that a State may criminalize the refusal to comply 
with a demand to submit to the required testing, just as a State may make it a crime 
for a person to obstruct the execution of a valid search warrant.”). 
252. State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224, 230–33 (Minn. 2016). 
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“enhanced embarrassment a urine test is likely to cause during an 
arrest.”253 
The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with the State on the 
level of physical intrusiveness of the search; that is, a urine test is 
more like a breath test than a blood test in terms of the physical 
intrusion.254 However, the court failed to give appropriate weight to 
this aspect of the analysis. In Thompson, the court’s entire analysis on 
the matter of the physical intrusiveness of the test consisted of two 
paragraphs, acknowledging that a urine test was not physically 
intrusive.255 The holding of the case rested on the fact that the other 
two privacy interests involved—the embarrassment in the 
application of a urine test and the potential misuse of a sample—
outweighed the low level of intrusiveness of the search, so that “[i]n 
sum, in terms of the impact on an individual’s privacy, a urine test is 
more like a blood test than a breath test.”256 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s reasoning misstates the 
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Birchfield.257 The Court 
held in Birchfield that “[b]ecause breath tests are significantly less 
intrusive than blood tests and in most cases amply serve law 
enforcement interests . . . a breath test, but not a blood test, may be 
administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk 
driving.”258 The Court did not place significant weight on the 
possibility that the State could use a retained sample for nefarious 
ends or that obtaining the sample could be an uncomfortable 
experience for the arrestee.259 When the case is considered in its 
entirety it is clear that the Birchfield decision rested on the 
intrusiveness of the test, and the Minnesota Supreme Court erred in 
failing to weigh this interest appropriately.260 
253. Id. at 229–30. 
254. Id. (citing Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2177). 
255. Id. 
256. Id. at 232. “[T]he fact that a urine test ‘places in the hands of law 
enforcement authorities a sample that can be preserved and from which it is 
possible to extract information beyond a simple [alcohol concentration] reading’ 
makes urine tests comparable to blood tests.” Id. at 231 (quoting Birchfield, 136 S. 
Ct. at 2178). 
257. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2160. 
258. Id. at 2185. 
259. Id. There are only two sentences mentioning of the potential misuse of any 
retained sample in the Birchfield decision, and they are not central to the holding of 
that case. See id. at 2178. 
260. See id. at 2185 (“Because breath tests are significantly less intrusive than 
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The court in Thompson gave far too much weight to the potential 
for the abuse of a retained sample from a urine test. The court stated 
decisively that “the fact that a urine test ‘places in the hands of law 
enforcement authorities a sample that can be preserved and from 
which it is possible to extract information beyond a simple [alcohol 
concentration] reading’ makes urine tests comparable to blood 
tests.”261 
Assuming the Thompson court had the freedom to evaluate this 
interest independently of United States Supreme Court guidance, it 
did so erroneously. The Thompson court considered this interest in 
its eventual decision to declare a statute unconstitutional—an action 
that Minnesota case law holds should only be done “with extreme 
caution and only when absolutely necessary.”262 Instead of declaring 
the statute unconstitutional, the court could have placed a limiting 
construction on the statue providing that any samples obtained for 
the purpose of testing for intoxicating chemicals would have to be 
destroyed immediately after testing.263 This would have allowed the 
court to uphold the statute as constitutional. Because Minnesota 
courts “should interpret a statute to preserve its constitutionality,” 
the court erred by failing to consider a limiting construction of the 
statute.264 
Though the language that the Thompson court used to describe 
the potential for embarrassment from the collection of a urine 
sample was more restrained, the court also erred in giving this 
interest great weight.265 Not long ago, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
made clear “that the warrantless inspection of an arrested man’s 
blood tests and in most cases amply serve law enforcement interests, we conclude 
that a breath test, but not a blood test, may be administered as a search incident to 
a lawful arrest for drunk driving.”). 
261. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 231 (quoting Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2178). 
 262. State v. Ness, 834 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Minn. 2013) (quoting In re Haggerty, 
448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. 1989)). 
263. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480−81 (2010) (quoting Reno v. 
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884 (1997)) (stating that the Court may impose a limiting 
construction on a statute to preserve its constitutionality if the statute is “readily 
susceptible” to such a construction). 
 264. Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 698 N.W.2d 1, 18 (Minn. 
2005); see also MINN. STAT. § 645.17 (2016) (“In ascertaining the intention of the 
legislature the courts may be guided by the following presumptions: . . . (3) the 
legislature does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or of this 
state . . . .”). 
 265. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 231 (“Urine tests for law enforcement purposes, 
regardless of how they are administered, implicate significant privacy interests.”). 
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penis was a valid search incident to arrest, noting that someone 
‘lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest retains no significant Fourth 
Amendment interest in the privacy of his person.’”266 
While the Minnesota Supreme Court does have the power to 
overrule its own cases,267 the court lacked support for its reasoning. 
The court cited Skinner for the proposition that “urine tests for law 
enforcement purposes, regardless of how they are administered, 
implicate significant privacy interests.”268 But Skinner does not 
support this proposition. The passage that the Thompson court relies 
on was the section of the Skinner Court’s explanation of why urine 
tests implicated the Fourth Amendment at all—not why they 
implicated especially significant privacy interests.269 
Further, the Thompson court’s implication that the privacy 
interests are significant regardless of the method of collection is 
directly contradicted by Skinner. The analysis in that case focused on 
the minimally intrusive nature of the procedure used to collect urine 
samples.270 This implies that the procedure used to collect samples, 
rather than what may be revealed by testing samples, is what 
implicates privacy interests. 
Finally, in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,271 the Supreme 
Court addressed a challenge to a school’s policy of subjecting its 
student athletes to random tests of their urine for the use of drugs.272 
It concluded that these tests constituted Fourth Amendment 
searches,273 just as the tests at issue in Thompson. In weighing the 
intrusion of the tests involved, the Court reasoned that, like Skinner, 
“the degree of intrusion depends upon the manner in which 
 266. State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, 767 (Minn. 2015) (quoting State v. Riley, 
303 Minn. 251, 254, 226 N.W.2d 907, 909 (1975)). 
 267. See Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 63 (Minn. 2010) (reasoning that 
although the Minnesota Supreme Court has the power to overrule its own decisions, 
the doctrine of stare decisis requires a compelling reason to do so). 
268. Id. (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989)). 
 269. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (“Because it is clear that the collection and 
testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long 
recognized as reasonable, the Federal Courts of Appeals have concluded 
unanimously, and we agree, that these intrusions must be deemed searches under 
the Fourth Amendment.”). 
270. Id. at 626 (holding in part that because the regulations do not require the 
urine sample to be furnished under the direct observation of a monitor and the 
sample is to be collected in a medical environment, the test is reasonable). 
271. 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
272. Id. at 648. 
273. Id. at 652. 
35
Weichsel: More Like Blood: State v. Thompson
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
960 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:4 
production of the urine sample is monitored.”274 The Court 
concluded, “These conditions are nearly identical to those typically 
encountered in public restrooms, which men, women, and especially 
schoolchildren use daily. Under such conditions, the privacy 
interests compromised by the process of obtaining the urine sample 
are in our view negligible.”275 Again, this clearly demonstrates that 
the Thompson court disregarded precedent when it stated that 
“regardless of how [urine tests] are administered, [they] implicate 
significant privacy interests.”276 
In addition to the possibility of a limiting construction of the 
statute regarding preservation of a urine sample, the Thompson court 
could have placed a limiting construction on the method of 
collection.277 While it is true that the statute must be “readily 
susceptible” to such a construction, in this case the statute meets this 
criterion. In both Skinner and Vernonia, the Supreme Court described 
the method of collection of a urine sample and reasoned that it was 
minimally intrusive.278 Given this clear precedent, and because 
Minnesota courts “should interpret a statute to preserve its 
constitutionality,” the Minnesota Supreme Court should have 
limited the procedures by which police are allowed to request a urine 
sample to minimize any intrusion on legitimate privacy interests 
instead of declaring the statute unconstitutional.279 
C. The Court Gave Too Little Weight to the Public Interests Involved 
In contrast, the government interest in protecting the public 
from the dangers of impaired driving is significant. The Thompson 
court cited Birchfield’s summation of the government interests in 
protecting society from the perils of drunk driving.280 The court 
274. Id. at 658. 
275. Id. 
276. State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224, 231 (Minn. 2016). 
277. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481 (2010) (quoting Reno v. 
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884 (1997)) (stating that the Court may impose a limiting 
construction on a statute to preserve its constitutionality if the statute is “readily 
susceptible” to such a construction). 
 278. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658; Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 
617 (1989). 
 279. State v. Ness, 834 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Minn. 2013) (quoting In re Haggerty, 
448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. 1989)). 
 280. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 232 (quoting Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. 
Ct. 2160, 2178 (2016)) (“[T]he Court reiterated the state and federal government’s 
‘paramount interest’ in preserving public-highway safety.”). 
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noted that the government has an interest both in getting impaired 
drivers off the road and in deterring impaired individuals from 
driving in the first place.281 The court also acknowledged the 
importance of criminal penalties for test refusal because 
administrative penalties are “unlikely to persuade the most 
dangerous offenders.”282 
After quickly summarizing the government interests, the court 
noted that the reasonableness of a particular type of test depends on 
the availability of alternatives.283 It noted that central to the Birchfield 
holding that warrantless blood tests are unconstitutional was the 
Court’s finding that, in most cases, a “less intrusive” breath test would 
serve the same government interests.284 It further noted that 
Birchfield held that the government “offered no satisfactory 
justification for demanding the more intrusive alternative [test].”285 
The Minnesota Supreme Court went one step too far. When 
interpreting Birchfield it held that “[t]he State here presents no 
justifications for warrantless urine tests other than those the Court 
considered and rejected in Birchfield in the context of blood draws.”286 
This is why the court had to find that urine testing impacted the 
individual’s privacy significantly more than breath tests. 
Significantly, the Supreme Court never stated that the 
justifications the State offered were per se unpersuasive and never 
actually “rejected” the interests asserted by the State.287 The Birchfield 
Court simply held that the interests were not “satisfactory” to support 
the “more intrusive” test.288 As the Thompson court admitted, “In 
terms of physical intrusion, therefore, a urine test is more similar to 
a breath test than a blood test.”289 Therefore, if the court had limited 
the method of collection, it would have been unable to analogize the 
results of Birchfield’s balancing test—in regard to blood tests—to 
urine tests, as it did.290 
281. Id. 
282. Id. (quoting Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2179). 
283. Id. 
284. Id. 
285. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
286. Id. at 233 (emphasis added). 
287. See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2181. 
288. Id. at 2184. 
289. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 230. 
290. See MINN. STAT. § 645.17 (2016) (“In ascertaining the intention of the 
legislature the courts may be guided by the following presumptions: . . . (3) the 
legislature does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or of this 
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Additionally, the Thompson court erred in its balancing of the 
interests involved in the case by entirely disregarding Maryland v. 
King.291 The court stated that “the warrantless search in King was not 
upheld as a search incident to a valid arrest, and as a result, King is 
inapposite to our analysis here.”292 While some constitutional issues 
are narrowly examined within different analytical frameworks, 
Fourth Amendment searches are not among them.293 Beyond this 
general argument, the Thompson court’s assertion is directly 
contradicted by Birchfield’s use of King in its analysis.294 The Birchfield 
Court compared the reasonableness of the DNA search in King to 
the reasonableness of blood searches and breath searches, even 
though the King decision relied on the inventory search exception 
and the reasonableness of blood and breath searches were being 
litigated based on the validity of the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception.295 
For the Thompson court to ascribe the same balance between 
breath and blood to breath and urine, it needed to find that the 
intrusiveness of a urine test is of the same level as a blood test. While 
Skinner did not concern criminal penalties or the search-incident-to-
arrest exception to the warrant requirement, it is illustrative because 
it is the only case in which the Supreme Court compared and 
contrasted tests of breath, urine, and blood, all in the same case.296 
In regard to urine tests, the Court stated, 
Like breath tests, urine tests are not invasive of the body 
and, under the regulations, may not be used as an occasion 
for inquiring into private facts unrelated to alcohol or drug 
use. We recognize, however, that the procedures for 
collecting the necessary samples, which require employees 
to perform an excretory function traditionally shielded by 
great privacy, raise concerns not implicated by blood or 
breath tests. While we would not characterize these 
additional privacy concerns as minimal in most contexts, 
state . . . .”); see also id. § 645.16 (“The object of all interpretation and construction 
of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”). 
291. See generally Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). 
292. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 231 n.6. 
293. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 398 (2006) (highlighting that 
the “ultimate touchstone” of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness). 
294. See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2177 (citing King, 133 S. Ct. at 1969). 
295. Id. 
296. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989). 
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we note that the regulations endeavor to reduce the 
intrusiveness of the collection process.297 
Thus, the Skinner Court implied that the privacy concerns 
implicated by urine tests could be rendered “minimal” by subjecting 
the collection of such samples to certain restrictions.298 
The Thompson court also did not give adequate weight to the 
interest that the government has in allowing warrantless urine tests 
as searches incident to arrest. While the Birchfield Court did not find 
that the government interest in combatting drivers under the 
influence of a substance other than alcohol is sufficient to allow 
warrantless blood searches, the issue of warrantless urine tests was 
not before the Court. Impaired driving is a compelling issue in the 
United States, and the statistics regarding drug-related car accidents 
and deaths are startling: 
Drugs other than alcohol (legal and illegal) are involved in 
about 16% of motor vehicle crashes. Marijuana use is 
increasing and 13% of nighttime, weekend drivers have 
marijuana in their system. Marijuana users were about 25% 
more likely to be involved in a crash than drivers with no 
evidence of marijuana use . . . .299 
While warrantless blood draws intrude too far into the 
constitutional right to privacy for the courts to allow them 
categorically, surely the less intrusive urine test, given the restrictions 
that the court could have placed on the collection and retention of 
samples, is justified by this compelling interest. 
D. Requiring a Warrant for Urine Tests Incident to Arrest for DWI Does 
Not Serve the Purposes of the Warrant Requirement 
In Birchfield, the Court emphasized the purpose of the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment in order to ensure that the 
outcome of its analysis served the intent behind the Amendment.300 
It stated that the warrant requirement protects privacy in two ways: 
First, [warrants] ensure that a search is not carried out 
unless a neutral magistrate makes an independent 
determination that there is probable cause to believe that 
297. Id. (footnote omitted). 
298. See id. 
299. Impaired Driving: Get the Facts, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/impaired_driving/impaired-drv 
_factsheet.html (last updated Jan. 26, 2017) (footnotes omitted). 
300. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2181. 
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evidence will be found. Second, if the magistrate finds 
probable cause, the warrant limits the intrusion on privacy 
by specifying the scope of the search—that is, the area that 
can be searched and the items that can be sought.301 
The Court further reasoned that neither of these purposes 
would be served by requiring a warrant for breath tests after an arrest 
for driving while intoxicated.302 Regarding the first purpose, the 
Court stated that in requesting a warrant, an officer would likely give 
a somewhat standardized recitation of facts that “are largely the same 
from one drunk-driving stop to the next and consist largely of the 
officer’s own characterization of his or her observations . . . . A 
magistrate would be in a poor position to challenge such 
characterizations.”303 The second purpose of the warrant 
requirement would be even less served by judicial oversight at the 
time of the arrest.304 Because the permitted scope of a chemical test 
would necessarily be defined by the test itself, “the warrants in 
question here would not serve that function at all.”305 
A warrant requirement for a urine test would not provide any 
protection from a neutral magistrate because the facts requiring a 
urine test would likely be the same in nearly every case. First, a police 
officer would have probable cause to believe that someone was 
driving while intoxicated, and either (1) the suspect would not 
exhibit a significant amount of alcohol in his system, perhaps due to 
an inability to take a breath test for a medical reason like asthma, or 
(2) police might find drugs or paraphernalia on a person who 
appeared to have been driving while impaired. Either way, as with 
the breath test at issue in Birchfield, “the officer would typically recite 
the same facts that led the officer to find that there was probable 
cause for arrest, [which would] consist largely of the officer’s 
characterization of his or her observations.” 306 The second purpose 
of the warrant requirement, that the neutral magistrate can define 
the scope of the search, 307 would also not be served by requiring the 




305. Id.; cf. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 (1989) (“[I]n 
light of the standardized nature of the tests and the minimal discretion vested in 
those charged with administering the program, there are virtually no facts for a 
neutral magistrate to evaluate.”). 
306. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2181. 
307. Id. 
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officer to get a warrant. The scope of the search would be the same 
in every case; that is to say, officers would be permitted to request 
that the suspect consent to a urine test. 
Requiring a warrant before a request for a chemical test would 
serve to validate an officer’s determination that probable cause 
exists. However, this oversight already exists because, in order to 
convict an individual for DWI test-refusal, the state must prove that 
the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant, thus 
validating the constitutionality of the search as a search incident to 
arrest. Therefore, instead of validating the search before it happens, 
the court would simply require police officers to validate their 
findings after the fact. Ideally, oversight by a neutral magistrate 
protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures while 
still allowing police to get impaired drivers off of the streets. But even 
if warrantless urine tests were allowed as searches incident to arrest 
and a police officer unreasonably required that someone perform a 
urine test after an erroneous arrest, a judge would review the 
officer’s judgment and have the power to throw out the case for a 
lack of probable cause.308 Further, for arrests that are clearly 
erroneous, not only will the case be dismissed, but victims of 
erroneous searches may be able to recover in tort for the violation of 
their personal autonomy.309 Therefore, the main historical purpose 
of the Fourth Amendment of protecting individuals from general 
warrants that effectively had no judicial oversight is not implicated 
in DWI test-refusal cases because any search under this statute must 
by necessity occur after an arrest, which would later be reviewed by 
a judge. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Because the Minnesota Supreme Court’s reasoning overstated 
the privacy interests implicated by urine testing and understated the 
 308. See State v. Rochefort, 631 N.W.2d 802, 805 (Minn. 2001) (citing In re 
Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Minn. 1997)) (“[W]e do conduct a de novo 
review of probable cause determinations made in connection with warrantless 
searches.”). 
 309. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (recognizing a cause of action for constitutional 
violations); see also Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 411 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
individuals have a right to be free from arrest absent either a valid warrant or 
probable cause, and that if police violate that right, they are not entitled to qualified 
immunity when their actions are objectively unreasonable in light of clearly 
established law). 
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public interests involved, the holding of the case was in error. 
Further, because requiring a warrant for urine searches incident to 
arrest for driving while impaired does not serve the purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment, the Minnesota Supreme Court erred by not 
considering that purpose in its analysis. For the reasons stated above, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court should reconsider its decision in a 
future case, or the United States Supreme Court should grant 
certiorari to address this issue.310 
 310. On January 13, 2017, Thompson petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the 
United States Supreme Court. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Minnesota v. 
Thompson, No. 16-887 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017). The Supreme Court denied the petition 
on March 20, 2017. Minnesota v. Thompson, 137 S. Ct. 1338 (2017). 
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